Command Line
bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no
Description
BCDEdit is often abused by cyber threats to modify boot policy in an attempt to inhibit system defenses.
Risk
Medium
Risk Reason
Disabling recovery options in boot policy can lead to potential issues on start-up and could be preparing for a drive impact event (encryption).
Fidelity
Medium
Fidelity Reason
This type of commandline activity is typically very rare in most organizations.
Operating Systems
Killchain Phases
References
MITRE ATT&CK TECHNIQUES
URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490
Description: Adversaries may delete or remove built-in operating system data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) This may deny access to available backups and recovery options.
Operating systems may contain features that can help fix corrupted systems, such as a backup catalog, volume shadow copies, and automatic repair features. Adversaries may disable or delete system recovery features to augment the effects of [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486).(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)
A number of native Windows utilities have been used by adversaries to disable or delete system recovery features:
* vssadmin.exe can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet
* [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) can be used to delete volume shadow copies - wmic shadowcopy delete
* wbadmin.exe can be used to delete the Windows Backup Catalog - wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet
* bcdedit.exe can be used to disable automatic Windows recovery features by modifying boot configuration data - bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no
Tactics: