Command Line
bcdedit /set {current} safeboot network
Description
BCDEdit is often abused by cyber threats to modify boot policy in an attempt to inhibit system defenses.
Risk
Medium
Risk Reason
Disabling safeboot options in boot policy can lead to potential issues on start-up and could be preparing for additional malicious activity.
Fidelity
Medium
Fidelity Reason
This type of commandline activity is typically very rare in most organizations.
Operating Systems
Killchain Phases
References
MITRE ATT&CK TECHNIQUES
URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/009
Description: Adversaries may abuse Windows safe mode to disable endpoint defenses. Safe mode starts up the Windows operating system with a limited set of drivers and services. Third-party security software such as endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools may not start after booting Windows in safe mode. There are two versions of safe mode: Safe Mode and Safe Mode with Networking. It is possible to start additional services after a safe mode boot.(Citation: Microsoft Safe Mode)(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019)
Adversaries may abuse safe mode to disable endpoint defenses that may not start with a limited boot. Hosts can be forced into safe mode after the next reboot via modifications to Boot Configuration Data (BCD) stores, which are files that manage boot application settings.(Citation: Microsoft bcdedit 2021)
Adversaries may also add their malicious applications to the list of minimal services that start in safe mode by modifying relevant Registry values (i.e. [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112)). Malicious [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) objects may also be registered and loaded in safe mode.(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019)(Citation: CyberArk Labs Safe Mode 2016)(Citation: Cybereason Nocturnus MedusaLocker 2020)(Citation: BleepingComputer REvil 2021)
Tactics: